

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
NAVAL AIR FORCE
CARRIER DIVISION FOURTEEN
Fleet Post Office
New York, New York

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Ser: 0300

28 December 1962

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From: Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Group BRAVO
(CTG 83.1) (CTG 136.2)

To: Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: Operations in support of the Cuban quarantine, 24 October -
21 November 1962; report of

Ref: (a) COMASWFORLANT CONF msg DTG 061730Z Dec

Encl: (1) Narrative of chronological events

(2) Summary of submarine contacts prosecuted during period
of report by CTG 83.1 (CTG 136.2)

(3) Summary of Soviet Bloc/Cuban/other shipping bound for
Cuba encountered during period of report by CTG 83.1
(CTG 136.2)

(4) Comments and recommendations

1. In accordance with reference (a) a report of operations in support of the Cuban quarantine operation is submitted. Operations during the period of this report were performed in two phases: Phase I was conducted during the period 26 October - 2 November in an area east of Cape Hatteras under the operational control of COMASWFORLANT. Phase II was conducted in the Cuban quarantine area during the period 2 - 18 November under the operational control of CTF 136. The specific details of the subject operations are contained in enclosures (1) through (4).

2. The following comments and lessons learned are considered worthy of special attention:

a. ASW Performance. ASW contact prosecution during this period highlighted the lack of modern ASW equipped units in Task Group BRAVO. The performance of DESRON 36 ships was considered outstanding even though there were no SCS-23 equipped ships in the squadron. A VDS equipped destroyer would have provided increased

DOWN GRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
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classification capability; particularly with respect to contact (C-29) (see Enclosure (2)). The datums assigned this group generally were large in area due to times late and JEZEBEL equipped VS aircraft would have aided considerably in efforts to localize the contacts. The SH-3A, (HSS-2) although plagued with mechanical problems, showed great promise as an ASW tool.

b. ASW Tactics. The experience gained in prosecuting unidentified submarine contacts during the period again emphasizes that there is a marked difference between standard ASW exercises as set forth in COMASWFORLANT TACNOTE 2-62 and the conditions usually encountered. During exercise periods there is always one basic assumption; namely that a submarine is definitely present in a well defined pre-arranged operating area. During ASW operations in support of the Cuban quarantine, the area of probability was very large and "time late" for designated datums was usually in excess of six hours. As a result, the tactics employed, by necessity, were different than those dictated "by the book". There were several occasions when the SAUs were operating in complete electronic and sonar silence with destroyers operating on single screw employing turn count masking in an effort to detect the contact by exploiting inherent human curiosity and the necessity for obtaining a battery charge. It is recognized that under conditions of actual hostilities, the destroyers could not exploit passive measures to this degree. MAD was disappointing as a classification device during the subject period. This may be accounted for as follows:

(1) During most of the period the MAD equipment in CVSG-52 was operating with less than a sense 9 or 10 capability.

(2) Contacts C-23 and C-29 appeared to be operating deep.

(3) One should consider the hypothesis that the Soviets are paying particular attention to carefully degaussing or deperming their submarines.

c. Availability of Forces for Assigned Missions. The special type of operations conducted during this period demanded a maximum of flexibility from all task group units. The composition of the HUK group proved well adapted to handle the missions encountered with the exceptions noted below:

(1) This task group is normally assigned a VAW-33 detachment of four EA-1E (AD5W) aircraft and six pilots. Around

the clock surveillance and ASW missions requiring relief on station over-extended the capabilities of the six pilots. It is recommended that the VAW-33 detachment be increased to twelve pilots and five aircraft to improve their availability margin for extended operations. Maintenance personnel should also be increased at a comparable ratio.

(2) Long transits between contacts tended to dissipate the effectiveness of destroyers in ASW prosecution. This became critical when two of the seven assigned destroyers were chopped to other forces. The normal logistics and rescue destroyer requirements of the remaining units made for minimum flexibility in the employment of this very necessary component of the ASW team. It is strongly urged that in future operations of this type the integrity of the HUK groups be maintained.

d. Communications. During the period of this deployment approximately 26,000 messages were received by broadcast, each requiring review and processing for proper addressees. The principal difficulty in communications was teletype failure on 100 wpm broadcast. The broadcast speed was increased from 60 to 100 wpm without commensurate equipment replacement. The predictable result was that the 60 wpm equipment would not stand up under sustained high speed operation. The requirement to cover two broadcasts concurrently aggravated the maintenance problem. Equipment capable of sustaining the high speed operation should be made available to HUK groups as soon as feasible in order to insure a capability for similar type employments in the future.

f. Logistic Support. Throughout the period logistic support was exceptionally good considering the transitory nature of the task group FIMs. It was apparent that considerable effort was required of the Service Force. The most serious support problems concerned delivery to WASP of high priority aviation repair parts and related materials. The inaccessability of WASP to air terminal points in the Caribbean area and the apparent commitment of VRC-49 aircraft to other requirements contributed to this problem. Surface supply of AOCP/ANFE requirements was not adequate and an expanded COD service is a necessity for future operations of this type.

e. MOVREPS. The standard MOVREF system was not adequate to keep operational commanders informed of the locations of TG 83.1 units with sufficient timeliness for tactical employment. Periodic PIMs and SITREPS were promulgated by the Task Group Commander to provide necessary information on location of units.

It is recommended that the MOVREP system be seriously reviewed to overcome this deficiency. It is suggested that the use of plain language changes (placed in NUCO code where classification required) be considered for the purpose of keeping operational commanders informed. The MOVREP system should be modified to provide the capability for accepting data provided in this manner.

g. Mail Delivery. Arrangements were made directly with Patrick Air Force Base to route mail through Grand Turk AAFB for pick up by WASP TF. This worked exceptionally well and provided regular deliveries. Normal mail routing for other TF 136 units was via destroyer or oiler and appeared to be subject to delay due to the continual shifting of forces in the quarantine line. POL and material delivery quickly over-rode mail delivery in priority. More efficient ways can and should be found to insure delivery of mail. Its effect on morale is too obvious to relegate it to low priority systems of delivery.

h. Ammunition. The lack of facilities for loading ammunition in the Boston area has been a continuing problem for ships utilizing this port as an operating base. During the period of DEF CON 3, the problem of providing ammunition became acute when planning for emergency sortie with ships berthed in the Navy Yard as well as those home ported in Boston. There is no ammunition facility in the Boston area to service fleet units. Had it become necessary to implement the emergency sortie plan, CTG 83.1 would have taken action to redistribute five inch ammunition and torpedoes from WASP to units in the dispersal anchorage to provide a modest capability to prospective screening units. Amplifying information is contained in enclosure (4).

Paul D. Buie
PAUL D. BUIE

Copy to:

CINCLANTFLT
COMSECONDEFLT
COMHUKFORLANT (3)
COMCRUDESFLT 6
CNO (OF-35W)
CNO (OF-03EG)
COMNAVAILANT
CO & DIR LANTFLTASWTACSCOL
COMCARDIVs 15, 17, 18, 20, 6, 2
COMDESRON 36 (2)
CVSG -52 (2)
CO VS-28 (2)
CO VAW 33

COMSUBLANT
DEF COMSUBLANT
COMASWFORPAC
CO USS WASP (CVS-18) (5)
COMDESDIV 362 (2)
CO HS-3 (2)
CO VS-31 (2)
OinC VAW 33 Det 18

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NARRATIVE

The following represents a chronological sequence of major events from the departure of Task Group BRAVO from Boston 24 October until its return 21 November 1962. Referenced messages are attached as Appendix I.

At 1900Z 24 October 1962, WASP with COMCARDIV-14 and Staff embarked, departed Boston enroute NORVA in accordance with COMASWFORLANT 232224Z Oct. COMDESDIV 242 embarked in WARRINGTON departed Newport and rendezvoused with WASP at 1300Z 25 October south of Nantucket Lightship for rescue destroyer services. CVSG-52 (less HS-11) embarked WASP at 1500Z 25 October. The air group conducted CARQUALS and refresher landings enroute NORVA.

WASP and WARRINGTON arrived off the sea buoy of Thimble Shoals Channel at 1130Z 26 October at which time HS-3 embarked in WASP. COMDESDIV 242 in WARRINGTON was released to proceed on duty assigned and WASP proceeded to anchorage X-RAY in Hampton Roads for ammunition loading.

Upon completion of loading out WASP departed NORVA at 2200Z enroute assigned operating area for ASW/shipping surveillance and training in accordance with COMASWFORLANT 260019Z Oct. COMDESRON 36 in R. A. OWENS, NEW and RICH departed NORVA and joined WASP off Cape Henry Light. COMCARDIV-14 (CTG 83.1) assumed the ASW Ready Duty at 1200Z on 27 October.

Initially the Task Group conducted operations in an area bounded by 31N, 35N, 69 W and 73W. Two air searches were launched daily covering the assigned area for all south bound and Soviet Bloc shipping. At 1000Z 28 October received a wirenote from COMASWFORLANT to investigate contact E-52 in vicinity 35-25N, 74-19W. This contact had been previously detected by NAVFAC Hatteras and a sonobuoy printing by a F-2H (P2V) from CTG 81.3. Shortly thereafter received contact E-55 (posit 34N 72W) for action. (COMASWFORLANT 280130Z Oct) This contact had resulted from a visual sighting by an Air Force pilot who described a small contact trailing a merchant ship. Correlation indicated a strong possibility that the contact was a helo from the task group. A previous sonar contact by HS aircraft of this group in the vicinity of E-55 lent further justification to its prosecution in spite of the low validity assigned the Air Force sighting. WASP set course and speed to a position for investigation of both contacts. USS CHIVO (SS-341) joined at noon 28 October. A conference was held aboard WASP with Executive Officer CHIVO to set up procedures for use of CHIVO as an SSK in prosecution of these contacts.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(1)-1

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Destroyers, VS and HS aircraft searched the vicinity of datum E-55 from 1500Z to 2200Z 28 October with no positive results. At 2200Z recalled the destroyers for fueling and dispatched CHIVO to the contact for passive search, concurrently assigning destroyers, VS and HS aircraft to E-52 for active prosecution of that contact.

The Task Group continued prosecution of these contacts through 30 October varying from active to passive type searches. (See contact E-52 and contact E-55, Enclosure (2)).

Ten shipping surveillance missions were flown during the period 0900Z to 2000Z 30 October in search of the Russian Elint ship SHKVAL with negative results. (COMASWFORLANT 300210Z Oct) USS HOLDER joined at 2100Z 30 October and the Task Group fueled from USS CALOOSA HATCHEE (AO-96) during the afternoon of 30 October.

On 31 October Task Group units continued search for SHKVAL and continued prosecution of contacts E-52 and E-55. Training exercises scheduled with CHIVO were cancelled when COMASWFORLANT msg 311433Z was received in the forenoon directing the Task Group to proceed south to vicinity 25N 70W to relieve CTG 83.2. COMDESDIV-362 in R. L. WILSON, DAMATO and BASILONE joined at 0300Z 1 November. At 1430Z 1 November several Staff members visited RANDOLPH via TF for a turnover conference.

Commencing at first light 2 November the Task Group conducted ASW/shipping surveillance of an area 100 x 100 miles square oriented north-south and centered at 26N 72-44W in accordance with COMASWFORLANT 312335Z. At 1200Z received COMASWFORLANT msg 020332Z directing CTG 83.1 to chop to CTF 136 as CTG 136.2, relieving COMCARDIV-18 (CTG 83.3). At 2000Z WASP rendezvoused with CANBERRA for conference between Rear Admiral BUIE (CTG 136.2) and Staff and Rear Admiral AILES (CTG 136 acting) and Staff. Upon return of Rear Admiral BUIE the task group set course and speed for position 25N 70W designated as station 8 of the quarantine line. Operations were conducted within a 150 mile radius of station 8.

At 0630Z received orders to take contact C-28 for action. (COMASWFORLANT 021425Z Nov) This contact had resulted from a reported visual sighting by a C-118 pilot of a surfaced submarine in the vicinity of 26-53N, 70-31W. (See C-28 Enclosure (2)). This contact was not developed and was dropped due to the questionable initial sighting and inability of forces to localize after twenty four hours of search.

During the morning of 3 November the Task Group fueled from USS NEOSHO. Upon completion of fueling, the task group set course and speed to arrive vicinity 24N, 69W to conduct ASW/shipping surveillance of an area bounded by 23N, 25N, 68W and 70W.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(1)-2

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At 0515Z 4 November VS aircraft sighted the Russian merchant ship DUBNO (See Contact 1 - Enclosure (3)). At 1115Z the task group shifted position to the southeast to 23N, 68W to search for the merchant ship PERAEUS (CTF 136 040135Z). At 1440R COMDESDIV-362 in R. L. WILSON with DAMATO was directed to chop to CTF 44 and rendezvous as soon as possible in vicinity of 25N 75W with CTG 44.8 (CTF 136 041942Z Nov).

At 1100Z 5 November sighted the Swedish passenger/cargo vessel CARIB (See contact 2 - Enclosure (3)).

At 1600Z 5 November the Task Group was directed by COMASW-FORLANT 051525Z Nov to take over contacts C-23 and C-29 from CTG 83.2. Took course and speed to a position midway between these contacts and commenced aircraft searches on a broad front 100 miles ahead of PIM.

At 0238Z forces obtained a hump fix (9325 mcs), followed by a disappearing radar contact. Three destroyers, HS and VS aircraft were dispatched to the contact area. Destroyers and HS obtained sonar contact which was eventually classified wake by CAC. Due to the proximity of the contact to C-23, forces were left at datum for continued search. A regeneration of C-23 appeared highly likely at the time. (See contact C-23-Enclosure (2)).

WASP and remaining destroyers continued enroute position to prosecute C-29. Air and surface forces arrived at the latter datum at first light 6 November. HS aircraft and RICH obtained sonar contact shortly after arrival. This contact was prosecuted for two days. (See Contact C-29 - Enclosure (2)).

At 1645Z 6 November sighted the Swedish freighter ANJAN (See contact 3 - Enclosure (3)).

Commencing 1300Z 7 November the task group replenished from USS DENEbola. At 2125Z received orders from CTF 136 to proceed south to rendezvous with WILLARD KEITH on 8 November (CTF 136 072110Z Nov and CTG 136.3 080230Z Nov). Continued prosecution of contacts with air and surface units while proceeding south and at 1200Z 8 November transferred LT. J. H. SLOUGH, USN, Russian interpreter, from WILLARD KEITH to WASP by hi-line. Upon receipt of directives (CINCLANTFLT 071944Z and 072210Z Nov) the Task Group commenced air searches covering CAICOS and MAYAGUANA passages and the area to the north in search of "Scotch Tape" ships. When it appeared that some designated ships had possibly passed to eastward of the search areas, an extra VS search was launched to search along a 100 mile front to a distance of 150 miles to the northeast. No designated Scotch Tape shipping was detected on this search.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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At 1915Z the Russian freighter MECHURESK was sighted by VS aircraft (See Contact 4 - Enclosure (3)). At 2035Z Scotch Tape 10, ALPAJEVSK, was sighted by aircraft (See Contact 5 - Enclosure (3)). A helo with Captain R. O. MIDDLETON, Chief of Staff, and LT. J. H. SLOUGH embarked, was vectored to this Russian ship. The required inspection was conducted and reported in accordance with existing directives. When the helo cleared the ship, HOLDER was directed to take position to trail Scotch Tape 10, ALPAJEVSK (CTG 136.2 090608Z Nov).

The Task Group rendezvoused with USS NEOSHO at 2000Z 8 November for fueling. At 2155Z, aircraft sighted the Russian merchant ship LABINSK, Scotch Tape 2. (See Contact 9 - Enclosure (3)). Shortly thereafter aircraft sighted the Russian merchant ship BRATSK, Scotch Tape 3, (See Contact 7 enclosure (3)). Aircraft tracked these contacts until surface forces were able to make contact. R. A. OWENS was assigned to intercept and trail BRATSK, Scotch Tape 3. NEW was assigned to trail LABINSK, Scotch Tape 2. Air searches were changed to cover the area between Silver Bank Passage and Crooked Island Passage at 090200Z in response to CTF 136 082022Z Nov.

At first light 9 November, a helo with Captain H. J. SILBERSTEIN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and LT J. H. SLOUGH embarked intercepted the Russian merchant ship BRATSK, Scotch Tape 3, which appeared to carry two ballistic missiles as deck cargo. Photographs were obtained from the helicopter and the required inspection was conducted and reported. R. A. OWENS closed when the helo cleared for additional photo coverage. BASILONE with Russian interpreter embarked, replaced R. A. OWENS to obtain additional required information (CTG 136.2 091344Z Nov).

At 1100Z 9 November sighted the Russian freighter MOSKOVSKY FESTIVAL (See Contact 6 - Enclosure (3)). NEW was recalled from Scotch Tape 2, LABINSK, when LEARY made contact with that ship. At 2338Z aircraft sighted the Russian merchant ship VOLGOLES, Scotch Tape 8. (See Contact 8 - Enclosure (3)). This ship had been previously cleared to proceed by higher authority.

The Task Group continued air searches for Scotch Tape ships on 10 November. USS JOHN KING (DDG-3) joined the task group at dawn 10 November. At 1145Z aircraft sighted and photographed RIA JLABACO, Cuban merchant ship (See Contact 10 - Enclosure (3)). At 2330Z sighted the Norwegian freighter TRAJAN (See Contact 11 - Enclosure (3)).

On 11 November detached JOHN KING to proceed to new assignment. The Task Group surface units conducted training exercises in vicinity stationary PIM at 23N 72W while continuing aircraft surveillance for designated shipping. At 1424Z sighted

ENCLOSURE (1)

(1) - 4

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the Russian merchant ship ALMETYEVS (See Contact 12 - Enclosure (3)). At 1515Z aircraft located the Russian merchant ship KARL MARX, Scotch Tape 1 (See Contact 13 - Enclosure (3)), which had been previously cleared. At 2350Z detached BASILONE and HOLDER to proceed vicinity 24-56N 71-17W (Datum C-23) to conduct active/passive search with two assigned VS aircraft. The Task Group proceeded to 24N 71W for new stationary FIM.

The group continued ASW/shipping surveillance on 12 November. At 1350Z sighted the small Cuban freighter BAHIA DE MANTANZAS (See Contact 15 - Enclosure (3)).

At 0728Z 13 November received COMASWFORLANT 122010Z directing CTG 136.2 to investigate a radar sinker in vicinity 26-02N 70-40W. The sinker had been obtained by USS SALAMONIE (See Contact C-33 - Enclosure (2)).

The group moved to the north to close this contact to facilitate support of search forces. At 1200Z the task group rendezvoused with USS SABINE for fueling.

At 1626Z on 14 November, HOLDER collided with WASP while coming alongside to starboard for fueling. The main deck edge of HOLDER was holed in four areas plus miscellaneous damage to main deck stanchions, mooring fittings and antennae. WASP sustained minor damage to the aircraft handling crane sponson and after antennae. Both ships continued their assigned mission with no loss in readiness. Captain Duncan FRANCIS, Commander Destroyer Squadron THREE SIX was designated to conduct an informal investigation of the collision (See CTG 136.2 142316Z, 151320Z and 15018Z Nov).

At 1240Z 15 November aircraft sighted the Russian merchant ship ATKARSK, Scotch Tape 13, being trailed by WILLIS A. LEE at posit 27-18N 70-41W course 260 - speed 10 kts. Closed LEE for pickup of photos for processing and further transfer to CNO/CINCLANTFLT.

On 16 November the Task Group rendezvoused with USS CHIKASKIA for fueling. Upon completion of fueling the task group took course and speed to intercept SELLERS who was trailing the Russian merchant ship OKHOTSK, Scotch Tape 14, (See Contact 17 - Enclosure (3)). HS aircraft intercepted SELLERS at dawn 17 November. WASP processed photos and delivered to GTMO for further delivery to CNO/CINCLANTFLT.

On 18 November Rear Admiral N. E. GAYLOR, COMCARDIV-20, and Staff members embarked WASP via COD for a conference preparatory to relieving this task group as TG 136.2 in the Quarantine Forces.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(1)-5

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Upon being relieved the Task Group chopped to COMASWFORLANT at 1800Z 18 November and proceeded to home ports. At 1250Z 18 November aircraft sighted and photographed the Russian freighter OKENBURG (See Contact 18 - Enclosure (3)). At 1500Z 19 November aircraft sighted and photographed the Cuban freighter RIO DAMUJJI (See Contact 19 - Enclosure (3)). All units arrived in home ports by 1400Z 21 November. The Cuban government subsequently released a report which was picked up by the U. S. News services that this vessel had been attacked by U. S. aircraft. Correlation of the time and place of the alleged attack confirm that the Cuban vessel was being identified and photographed by unarmed VS aircraft of this group using identical tactics to those employed throughout the period.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(1)-6

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ATTACHED MESSAGES

APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE (1)

PRECEDENCE
OP-IMMEDIATE

CTG 83.1//

INFO CINCLANTFLT//COMSECFLT//COMFAIRNORVA//COMELTRAGRU GTMO//CTG 83.2
COMDESRON 36//COMDESDIV 362//COMNAVBASE GTMO//DEPCOMSUBLANT//COMFAIRWINGSLAT

// C O N F I D E N T I A L //

MOVORD.

- A. COMASWFORLANT 230020Z NOTAL.
B. CINCLANTFLT 251402Z NOTAL.

1. THIS MODIFIES REF A, UPON COMPLETION AMMO LOADING 26 OCT DEPART NORFOLK WITH WASP AND DESDIV 361 PROCEED VICINITY 34N-72W CONDUCT ASW TRAINING, AND ASW SEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE IN FOL AREA 35N-73W TO 35N-69W TO 31N 69W, TO 31N-73W TO ORIGIN.
2. ASSUME ASW READY DUTY 271300Z.
3. IAW REF B COMDESDIV 362 WITH WILSON, BASILONE AND DAMATO TENTATIVELY SCHED DEPART GTMO 29 OCT, WILL BE DIRECTED TO JOIN TG 83.1 FOR ASW OPS.
4. POSSIBLE SERVICE SUBMARINE MAY BE ASSIGNED FOR TRAINING. WILL ADVISE.

REFERENCE 230020Z (C) *****

1. PLAN SAIL TO 83.1 LESS DESDIV 362 AND HOLDER 27 OCT AND RELIEVE TO 83.2 ASK RDTY AT SEA 29 OCT.
"QUOTED IN PART"

REFERENCE 251462Z () NOT HELD THIS COMMAND.

FLAG 14 AT Z

[illegible]

12.00

CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

OP-IMJED

ACTION

CTG 83.1

1122

CTG 81.5/CTF 85

~~//CONFIDENTIAL//~~

EP SHKVAL 292130Z 3310N 7125W. GENERAL MOVEMENT NNW. LOCATE THEN
ASSIGN DD TO TRAIL. PSV ENR PAX RIVER TO BERMUDA AND PSM ENR
BERMUDA TO NORVA REQUESTED TO SEARCH AREA ENR AND MAKE SIGHTING REPORT
TO CTG 83.1

CWO NOTE: THIS MSG READDRESSSED BY CTG 83.1 TO COMDESRON 36.

READDRESSAL TDTG 300815Z VIA VISUAL. TOR 0842Z 30 OCT
MSG REROUTED DUT TO READDRESSAL.

LAG2000-001 AT 1000000Z

1009														RELEASE														
LTJG FALON f								TOP/LOC DATE WK 0504Z 30 OCT 82//DSC//						METHOD NR. 4915				OTE 30021KZ										
ZDR	CZE	O:	A:	P:	ADP	DEF	SOP	LOG	AO	FLE	SEC	CIC	DPA	NX	PLO	SDO	SWO											
			A																									
CC	XO	O:	DP:	AIR	GUN	ENG	NAV	SUP	MED	DEW	AO	COF	PER	LEG	CHP	EDU	TRA	CIC	AGP	A:	PLO	WX	LDO	GDC				
I	I	R	I				I																					
CFO	VIS	VS	HQ	HC	J.J.	VAR						NNPO	ENC	CPO	KO	ILT	MAP	SEU	ROD	SIG	RFD	GEX	WP	CMC				

CONCLUSION

COMASWFORLANT

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OP-1 MED

ACTA

CTG 83.2/83.1/CTF 136

412

COMSECONDFLT/CTG 136.1/CINCLANTFLT/COSUBLANT/COMSERVLANT/CNAL/CTG 81.4
CTF 44/COMDESRON 36/COMDESRON 23/COMDESRTV 362/CTG 61.6/CTG 136.2/
MARAS/DEP COMSUBANT/COMCRUDESLANT/COMCRUDESFLOT 4

// CONFIDENTIAL //

MOVORD

- A. MY 271749Z
B. MY 271827Z PASEP
C. COMSERVLANT 301553Z PASEP

1. WHEN CTG 83.1 APPROACHES VIC 27N 74W ABOUT 012100Z AND PROVIDING CTG 83.2 NOT PROSECUTING ACTIVE CONTACT CTG 83.2 ASSUME ASW READY DUTY AND PROCEED AREA BOUNDED BY 35N 73W TO 35N 69W TO 31 N 69W TO 31N 73W. CONDUCT ASW SEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE BLOC SHIPPING EN ROUTE TO AND WITHIN OPAREA. DIRLAUTH BETWEEN CTG 83.1 AND CTG 83.2. BE PREPARED TO PROSECUTE UNIDENT SUBMARINE CONTACTS.
2. IN EVENT TG 83.2 IS PROSECUTING ACTIVE CONTACT TG 83.1 WILL OPERATE VICINITY 27N 74W UNTIL DIRECTED BY COMASWFORLANT TO RELIEVE TG 83.2.
3. CTG 83.1 RELIEVE CTG 83.2 PROVIDING ASW/SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT TO CTF 136 AND CTF 44 AS PRACTICABLE WHEN OPERATING VICINITY THOSE UNITS. OPERATE VICINITY 25N 72W OR AS DIRECTED IN ORDER PROVIDE DESIRED ASW/SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT.
4. MODIFY EXECUTIVE OF THIS INJUNCT TO INSURE CONTINUOUS PROSECUTION OF ANY SUBMARINE CONTACTS. KEEP COMASWFORLANT AND EACH OTHER INFORMED OF PLAN AND INTENTIONS.
5. TG 83.2 REFUEL FROM MARIAS 4 NOV 14W REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C.
6. FOR CTF 136: UEC UNDER TG 35.1 3 NOV. SUBJECT YOUR APPROVAL WILL PROPOSE TASK GROUP STAGE 1 (B-1) 17 REF 14 FOR TG 83.2 NOW OPERATING AS TG 136.2 AFTER 3 NOV 0000.

FLAG 14

13

LTJG TOPHAM										DATE										3 12 83 3 7									
ADP	CPS	G	AT	F	ADP	ED	SF	SL	ST	EN	N	T	D	E															
CO	XO	O'	ONE	AIR	CON	ENG	NAV	SHIP	MIL	ED	CL	OLF	PER	LEG	CB	EUL	TR	CIC	ASD	A	PID	WY	CCO	ED					
1	1	1																1											
CAG	VS	VS	HS	H	H	V				THRO	EWL	KPD	YS	ELY	AMP	EVN	RDD	SIG	RPO	OD	VF	AN							

CTF 136

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLAS

PRECEDENCE:

FLASH

CTG 83.1

UNCLAS

A. COMASWFORLANT 020650Z

1. REF A YOURS FORAC

2. INFORM ORIG YOUR POSIT AND PIM

REF A: COMASWFORLANT 020650Z

ALFA RED 2 NOV.

BRAYO C-28..... QUOTED IN PART

SWO AT 1430Z

FLAG 14-0000000000

[illegible]

FROM	CLASSIFICATION	PRECEDENCE
COMASWFORLAUT	CONFIDENTIAL	OP-ILMED

CTG B3.1

CTF 136//COMSECONDFLT//CTG 83.2//CTG 136.2//CTG 81.4//CTF 85//CTG 81.5//

CHUO//CINCLANTFLT//DENEBOLA//COMSERVLANT//COMCARIBSEAFRON//COMNAVAIRLANT//
COMCRUDESLANT

// C O N F I D E N T I A L //

A. CINCLANTFLT 020318Z NOTAL

1. IAD REF (A). CHOP TO CTF 136 UPON RECEIPT.

2. ACKNOWLEDGE

REF : CINCLANTFLT 020318Z NOTAL

REF NOT HELD THIS COLLEAND

FLAG 14AT.....Z

[illegible]

CTF 136

CLASSIFICATION
 UNCLAS

PRIORITY
 OP-IMMED

CTG 136.1 CTG 136.2

STICKEIL

UNCLAS

1. FOR CTG 136.2

A. CONDUCT AIR SEARCH 1ST LIGHT 4 NOV FOR MERSHIP PERAEUS

EP 040500R 20-55N 66-14W

BASED ON 2 DAY DR

2. FOR CTG 136.1

DIRECT STICKELL TO COMMENCE DAILY PATROL TO EAST TO BE
 READY TO INTERCEPT PERAEUS WHEN LOCATED BY AIRCRAFT

532										0215Z 04 NOV										HI COM										040135Z									
LTJG TOPHAM																																							
PRG	C/E	OP	AI	PI	AGP	DEF	SOF	LOG	AO	FLY	SEC	CIC	GPA	WX	PIO	SIG	SWJ																						
CO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1											
CAR	VS	VS	HS	HS	NU	VAN						NRPO	EMC	CPD	WO	FLT	MAR	SWJ	ADO	SIG	RPO	GEI	BR	CO															

SUBJECT		CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY
USS WASP		UNCLASSIFIED	DEFERRED
ACTION			
COMNAVIAIRANT			
INFO			
COMCARDIV-1A			

UNCLAS

A. YOUR 241807Z OCT

1. OBLIG REPT 03320/24011/61

A. FOUR TWO NINE ZERO THREE ONE PT ZERO ONE

B. FIVE NINE PT THREE ZERO

2. OBLIG REPT 03320/24011/62

A. FIVE THREE ZERO FIVE THREE SEVEN PT TWO TWO

B. SIX NINE FIVE THREE ZERO PT SEVEN ONE

3. OBLIG REPT 0579/24011/61

A. SIX FOUR FIVE SIX PT SIX TWO

B. FIVE FIVE PT NINE EIGHT

4. OBLIG REPT 0579/24011/62

A. FOUR ZERO FIVE TWO PT NINE ONE

B. ONE SEVEN ONE THREE PT EIGHT ZERO

AIR MAIL ----- OPERATION MINIMIZE

FLAG 1407Z OCT 62

532		R. E. KNIGHT, CDR, SC, USN		W. E. TEUFEL, CDR, USN																			
LTJG TOPHAT		0144Z 04 NOV 62		040144Z																			
ADM	C/S	CI	AI	PI	ACI	DEF	SDP	LOG	AL	FLT	SEC	CIC	GFA	NA	FIG	SDO	END						
								A															
CO	XO	OP	OP1	AIH	GLN	ENG	NAV	SUP	MED	SEN	AO	COF	PER	LEG	CHP	EDU	TRF	CIC	AOP	AI	FIO	WX	COC
								O															
CAG	VS	VS	NS	NS	HU	VAV						NRFO	EXC	CPD	AC	ILT	IMT	SMU	RDO	SIC	RFO	GEF	VT

SINCE

CLASSIFICATION

REFERENCES

OP 1M

ACTION

CTG 136.2

11

CINCLANTFLT CTF 44 GROCRUDESANT CTU 44.8.1 CTG 44.8
COMASWEORLANT

CONFIDENTIAL

A. CINCLANTFLT 031852Z

1. IAW REF A PARA 2 CHOP 2 DD TO CTF 44. DIRECT SHIPS TO PROCEED VICINITY 25N 75W AND RDVU ASAP WITH CTG 44.8.
2. THIS CONFIRMS MY 041940Z NOTAL.

REF A: C/NCLANTFLT 031852Z NOT HELD AT THIS TIME

B: CTF 136 031852Z NOTAL (U) ACTION CTF 136.2

"CHOP 2 DD TO CTF 44....."

LAC 14 AT Z

[illegible]

// CONFIDENTIAL //

A. CTF 136 072126Z

B. CTF 136 081956Z

1. MODIFY STATION ASSIGNMENT REF A TO VIC POSITION 23N 72W
ARRIVE PRIOR FIRST LIGHT 9 NOV.
2. ESTABLISH AIR SEARCH AS FEASIBLE AREA BETWEEN SILVER
BANK PASSAGE AND CROOKED ISLAND PASSAGE
AT FIRST LIGHT 9 NOV. EXTEND SEARCH TO THE SOUTH WEST AS
PRACTICABLE. THIS SUPERSEDES PARA 1. REF B.

REFERENCE: 072126Z. (C)

A. CTF 136 062112Z B. CTF 136 072016Z C. CINCLANTFLT 071844Z

1. STATION TG 136.2 VIC 23.7N PRIOR FIRST LIGHT..ETC..QUOTED IN PART

REFERENCE: 081956Z (c)

SITREP A. CINCLANTFLT 081500Z 1. HAVE BEEN CALLING SCOTCH TAPE
SEVEN TAD REF A. NO ANSWER. C. ETC. QUOTED IN PART. . .

FLAG 14ccccccccccccccccccZ

[illegible]

CTG 136.2

UNCLAS

PRECEDENCE
OP-IMMED

CNO //SCLANTFLT //

CTF 136 // COMASWFORLANT

UNCLAS

SITREP SCOTCH TAPE THREE

1. AT 091236Z WASP HELO CLOSED SCOTCH TAPE THREE AT 2255N-7231W.

2. FOLLOWING DECK CARGO OBSERVED.

A. TWO MOBILE CRANES.

B. TWO CANVAS COVERED TRUCKS

C. TWO VANS

D. SMALL VEHICLE CANVAS COVERED

E. TWO OBJECTS ABOUT SIXTY FT. LONG AND FOUR FEET DIAMETER.

APPARENTLY MISSILES WITHOUT NOSECONC ATTACHED. APPEARS TO CHECK
WITH UNCLAS PHOTOS MRBM. SMALL TARP REMOVED. SKIN TIGHT CANVAS
TAILORED TO FIT NOT REMOVED. FOUR STUBBY CANARD STABILIZING
FINS NOTED. BULGE OF WIRING CONDUIT VISIBLE.

3. SHIP LIGHTLY LOADED. APPROX EIGHTY FIVE PERSONNEL ON DECK
INCLUDING WOMEN WITH DOGS. GENERALLY DOUR ATTITUDE.

4. LANGUAGE USED RUSSIAN

5. VESSEL DID NOT STOP AND NOT REQUESTED TO STOP.

6. DID NOT RESPOND TO FLASHING LIGHT SIGNAL. SIGNALMAN TURNED

[illegible]

[illegible]

OP-IMMED

CTG 136.2

CONFIDENTIAL

~~PRIORITY~~

CINCLANTFLT

GTF 136 // COMASWFORLANT // COMNAVAIRLANT // CNO (COMFNPIC)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SITSUM ALAPAYEVSK

1. AT 082045Z HELO FROM WASP WITH CHIEF OF STAFF ABOARD ARRIVED 21-50N 74-20W AND INTERCEPTED ALAPAYEVSK. COMMUNICATION BY FLASHING LIGHT REASONABLY GOOD BUT SOMEWHAT SLOW AND OCCASIONALLY GARBLED. HELO TRANSMITTED IN RUSSIAN. SHIP REPLIED IN ENGLISH. QUICK AGREEMENT ON PHOTOGRAPHY. GOOD PHOTOS DESPITE APPROACHING DUSK. PHOTOS ENROUTE. HELO HOVERED TWICE FOR GIFT EXCHANGE. TIE CLASP AND BOTTLE VODKA. MUCH WAVING OF HANDS IN GREETING. UPON DEPARTURE HELO AT 082200Z MASTER CLASPED HANDS TOGETHER OVER HEAD IN FRIENDLY GESTURE. GESTURE RETURNED.

2. FOLLOWING NOTED:

A. OF FIVE CARGO HATCHES NO.3 AND NO.5 OPEN. NO.1 CLOSED. NO.2 AND NO.4 CARRIED DECK CARGO.

B. OPEN HATCHES CONTAINED COTS, BLANKETS, DUFFLE BAGS AND APPROX FIFTY WOODEN BOXES (SIZE OF CASE OF RUM).

C. SHIP LIGHTLY LOADED.

3. DECK CARGO INCLUDED:

A. FOUR FUEL TRUCKS (TWO OF THESE MAY BE OXIDIZER TRUCKS);

B. FIVE STAKE TRUCKS WITH LOADS OF DRUMS AND MISCELLANEOUS SMALL BOXES. BODIES OF TWO TRUCKS PARTIALLY COVERED WITH CANVAS.

C. ONE DUMP TRUCK WITH BODY COVERED.

D. TWO EARTH MOVERS, APPARENTLY ROAD SCRAPERS.

E. ONE SMALL CRANE PAINTED GREEN.

F. THREE WOOD BURNING FIELD MESSSES ON PORT SIDE AFT. ONE FIRED UP AND IN USE.

4. APPROX 200 MEN COUNTED TOPSIDE AND IN OPEN HATCHES. MANY APPEARED TO BE YOUNG MEN. MANY NOT WEARING SHIRTS. APPEARED FRIENDLY AND ALMOST JUBILANT. PERHAPS HAPPY TO GO HOME.

5. HOLDER CLOSED AT DUSK AND AT 082240Z RECEIVED FROM ALAPAYEVSK BY
LIGHT QUOTE HAVE ROCKET TECHNICALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENT

[illegible]

FROM	CTG 136.2	CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY
ACTION		UNCLASSIFIED	OP-1/11ED
CINCLANTFLT			
INFO	CTF 136		

UNCLAS

DESTROYER ENCOUNTERS WITH SCOTCH TAPE 3

A. CINCLANTFLT 090338Z

B. CTG 136.2 091344Z

1. OWENS APPROACHED SCOTCH TAPE THREE IMMEDIATELY AFTER WASP HELO APPROACH PER REF B. IN WHICH ALL NECESSARY INFO AND PHOTOS OBTAINED. OWENS APPROACH FOR LIMITED ADDITIONAL PHOTO COVERAGE ONLY.

2. DATA PER REF A.

A. VISUAL CALL IN ENGLISH. NO REPLY.

B. INITIALLY MAKING BARE STEERAGEWAY THEN INCREASED SPEED TO TEN KNOTS.

C. NEGATIVE.

D. 800 YARDS.

E₈ NOT CONSIDERED APPLICABLE.

3. AT 092015Z BASILONE CLOSED SCOTCH TAPE 3 FOR PURPOSE OF ASKING SPECIFIC QUESTION QUOTE HOW MANY MISSILES DO YOU HAVE ON BOARD UNQUOTE. REPLY RECEIVED QUOTE I HAVE TWO ROCKETS ON BOARD UNQUOTE.

4. FOLLOWING INFO PER REF A.

A. STARTED IN RUSSIAN BUT SHIFTED TO ENGLISH UPON ASCERTAINING SCOTCH
TAPE 3 REP SPOKE GOOD ENGLISH.

B. NEGAT

C. NEGAT

DE SEVEN FIVE YARDS

E. COOPERATIVE BUT NOT ENTHUSIASTIC.

REF: 0905387

(C) QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF SCOTCH TAPE
SHIPS MAILED.....

REF: CS13442

(U) SITREP SCOTCH TAPE THREE.....

FLAG 14 ---AT---Z

[illegible]

FROM CTF 136	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	PROCESSING OP-111ED
SUBJECT CTG 136.2 (READD: 130046Z)		
INFO		

ORIGINAL HEADING:

FM:COMASWFORLANT

TO:CTF 136/ SALAMONIE/A

INFO: AIG 43/TG 136.2

// C O N F I D E N T I A L //

A. RED 13 NOV.

B. DESIG C-33

1. USS SALAMONIE REPORTS SITUATION THREE ROMEO 26-02N 70-40W AT 121755Z

2. FOR CTF 136 REQUEST CTG 136.2 INVESTIGATE. ACK.

3. FOR USS SALAMONIE YOUR REPORT DID NOT INCLUDE INFO ADDEES

1AW CLF 03360.SF. SEND AMPLIFIER ASAP.

4. INITIAL CLASS POSSIBLE SUBMARINE NOT US OR KNOWN FRIENDLY.

FLAG 14 ---AT---Z

BU NR 1992		ORIGINATOR										RELEASE																
CDS LTJG FALCO		TOR/TMO 0602Z 13 NOV. 1962 G.B.										METROG DURATT					DTS 1 2 2 0 1 0 Z											
ADM	C/S	OP	AI	PI	ADP	DEF	SOP	LOG	AO	FLT	SEC	CTC	GPA	WX	P10	SBO	SNO											COM
				A																								
CO	XO	OP	OP1	ATR	SUN	ENG	NAV	SUP	MED	SEN	AO	COF	PER	LES	CHP	EDU	TRA	CIC	ADP	AI	P10	WX	CNO	DOB				
CAG	VS	VS	NS	NS	HU	VAV									NRFO	ENG	CPO	WC	ILT	MAR	SHU	ROD	SIG	RPO	SEN	WR	CON	

CTF 136.2

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

SECTION
CTF 136/COMNAVAIRLANT/COMCRUDESANT/COMASWFORLANT

CNO/CINCLANTFLT/BUSHIPS/COMCRUDESFLT FOUR/ VASP/COMDESRON 36/HOLDER

CONFIDENTIAL //

CASREP

A6. DAMAGE MAIN DECK FWD HOLDER AND A/C HANDLING CRANE SPONSOR: WASP.

~~B. NO PERSONNEL INJURIES. PRELIMINARY INV. ESTIMATION INDICATES NO PERSONNEL~~

CG. COLLISION BETWEEN WASP AND HOLDER DURING HOLDER APPROACH FOR REFUELING. ~~CRASH OF~~ OCCURED AT LAT 26-13 N, LONG 75-58W AT 141726Z. CG, WASP WAS OTC OF A ~~UNIT~~ UNIT CONSISTING OF WASP, HOLDER, RICH AND BASILONE IN ORDER TO CONDUCT UNDERWAY REFUELING COMPET (Z-29-S).

WASP ON ROMEO GURPEN .25 SPEED 12 KNOTS. WIND 34/27. SEA FROM NW 5 TO 7FT.. ON MAKING APPROACH HOLDER CONTACTED STARBOARD SIDE WASP.

D. ESTIMATE BOTH SHIPS ABLE CONTINUE PRESENT ASSIGNMENTS AND NO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ALTHOUGH REPORT FROM HOLDER NOT YET COMPLETE.

E. N. A.

F. TENDER OR SHIPYARD ASSISTANCE PROBABLY REQ FOR PERMANENT REPAIR.

INDIVIDUAL SHIP REPORTS WILL AMPLIFY. UNODIR WILL APPPOINT COUNDESMAN 36 FOR
ONE OFFICER INFORMAL INVESTIGATION. 12/1/73 1

REF ID: A66666

22-0	W.B. [unclear]	RECEIVED	15
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TEL/TOD	DATE	BY	METHOD
00017	11 NOV 68		

[illegible][illegible]

CD	KO	GP	OP1	AIR	GUN	ENG	NAV	SUP	MED	DEN	AG	COS	PER	LEG	CNR	EDU	TOL	DIC	ASD	AD	PAC	AFM	SEC
----	----	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	-----	-----	-----

[illegible]

CAC	V5	V5	H.	HS	HA	VAN				NRPD	EAO	CPO	BO	ILT	MST	SAL	BND	RIC	DWC	GTM	WV	KSA
-----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	--	--	--	------	-----	-----	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	-----

[illegible]

SWO NOTE: ROUTED TO SIO ARLING 10-1-88

ALCOHOL TO SPIN WHILE ON C.H.C.

FROM

CTF 136 (READD DTG: 150950Z)

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

ACTION

TF 136

INFO

ORIGINAL HEADING

-DEFERRED-141040Z

-FROM CINCLANTFLT

-TO COMSECONDFLT/COMPHIBLANT

-INFO COMPHIBGRU 3/CG FMFLANT / CG FIVE MEB / COMCARIBSEAFRON

// C O N F I D E N T I A L //

CONDUCT AN INDOCTRINATION OF ATLANTIC FLEET PERSONNEL IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

A. CINCLANTFLT INST 1620.1

1. NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES DEPLOYED IN CARIBBEAN AREA HAVE
ALWAYS ENJOYED AN OUTSTANDING REPUTATION AS REGARDS DISCIPLINE
AND BEHAVIOR ASHORE.

2. WITH THE RECENT GROWTH OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN CARIBBEAN
AREA THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING THESE HIGH STANDARDS WILL BECOME
SIGNIFICANT. IN VIEW OF THE UNDUE EXAGGERATION AND ADVERSE
PUBLICITY WHICH WILL SURELY RESULT FROM ANY INCIDENTS IN CARIBBEAN
PORTS IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT ALL DEPLOYED US FORCES MAINTAIN
THE IMAGE OF A WELL TRAINED, READY, HIGHLY DISCIPLINED TEAM.

3. ACCORDINGLY ALL COMMANDS ARE ENJOINED TO EXERT PARTICULAR
EFFORTS TOWARD THE END OF AVOIDING ALL INCIDENTS ASHORE AND OF
MAINTAINING THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF FRIENDLY PERSON TO PERSON

FROM	CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY
ACTUAL		
INFO		

(PAGE TWO OF TWO)

F. FIQI DEGAUSSING COIL ARMORED CABLE PIERCED.

2. HOLDER ESTIMATES RFS ~~151500Z~~ 151500Z.

3. RECOMMEND CONTINUE PRESENT ~~ASSIGNMENTS~~ ASSIGNMENTS.

REF : 142316Z (C) : A. DAMAGE MAIN DECK FWD HOLDER AND A/C HANDLING
CRANE SPONSON WASP.....

.....QUOTED IN PART.....

FLAG 14
/DN/

0119m
15

RU NR 2284		DETACH LCDR WRIGHT <i>W B Wright</i>										RELEASE																
CNO FMS PHILLIPS		TTC TOC 1702Z 15 NOV 52										DATE 11 PG																
METH TGO		F.L.										151320Z																
ADM	C/S	CP	AT	PI	ADP	DEF	SEP	LOG	AO	FLY	SEC	CIC	OPA	EX	PIC	SDO	SWO											COM
CO	XO	OP	OP	AIR	GUN	ENG	NAV	SUP	MED	DEN	AO	COF	PER	LEG	CHP	EDU	TRA	CIC	ADP	AT	PIC	EX	COO	ODD				
1	1	A	1																									
CAS	VS	VS	HS	HS	HU	VAB						NRPO	EMO	CPO	RO	ILT	MAR	SKU	RDO	SIG	RPS	GEN	WK	CCU				

CONFIDENTIAL

**SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE CONTACTS PROSECUTED BY TG 83
DURING THE PERIOD 27 OCTOBER - 18 NOVEMBER 1962**

CONTACT E-55

1. Background. An Air Force aircraft sent following report: "8 surface vessels within 30 mile radius by radar at 272100Z coords 34N 72W also visual sighted 1 cargo vessel with smaller vessel trailing 5 miles behind believed to be submarine. Headed south." During debrief pilot made reference to a small aircraft at low altitude in the area.

2. Comment. This Task Group was in the area at the time specified and HS aircraft were airborne on surface surveillance mission. It appeared highly likely that the contact sighted was one of TG 83.1 helicopters. However, in view of the fact that HS aircraft had made sonar contact independently in the vicinity of the Air Force sighting at 1820Z, destroyers and VS aircraft were sent to the contact area. VS aircraft dropped sonobuoy pattern and obtained cavitation but destroyers were unable to gain active sonar contact. HS aircraft went cold at 2000Z. Further efforts to develop contact by SAU were unsuccessful through the night of 28 October. At 0007Z 30 October VS aircraft obtained a disappearing radar contact followed by JULIE and cavitation at posit 34-24N 72-37W. Again forces were unable to localize contact.

At 2100Z CHIVO was dispatched to E-55 contact area to conduct a passive sonar search during the night of 29/30 October. Surface forces were pulled clear of the area. No submarine contact was gained by CHIVO and the contact was dropped at 1300Z 31 October.

3. Evaluation. The abundance of marine life (whales) which could generate the disappearing radar/sonar contacts obtained, coupled with the lack of MAD verification strongly indicated non-sub classification of this contact. Sonar conditions were excellent with an isothermal gradient down to 200 feet and thence 3 degrees negative per 100 feet. Sea conditions were favorable with a state one or lower sea running during the time period of prosecution of contact E-55. Visibility was unlimited.

CONTACT E-52

1. Background. At 0641Z 27 October, P2V aircraft from COMFAIR-NORVA obtained sonobuoy contact at posit 34-57N 74-19W. Aircraft commenced coordinating with NAVFAC HATTERAS and between 0540Z and 0910Z 28 October SOSUS held contact evaluated possible ZULU class. Datum was relocated 35-25N 74-12W and assigned a 15 mile radius of probability.

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2. Comment. Task Group 83.1 was assigned to prosecute by COMASWFORLANT at 1000Z 28 October. Destroyers and aircraft arrived at contact area on the afternoon of 28 October. At 1915Z RICH gained sonar contact at position 35-01N 74-27W, movement to the northeast at slow speed. This contact was evaluated non-sub, marine life, after erratic tracking with no MAD verification for several hours. Destroyers and aircraft continued broad area search around datum.

Destroyers were recalled for fueling on 30 October and CHIVO was directed to proceed to datum for a passive sonar search during the hours of darkness. CHIVO obtained no contacts and was recalled the morning of 31 October. No further prosecution of the contact was possible due to the diversion of the Task Group to the Cuban quarantine area.

3. Evaluation. No valid sub contact at E-52 by units of this Task Group. The one sonar contact was evaluated non-sub by the highly experienced CAC (COMDESRON-36). Sonar conditions were excellent with an isothermal gradient down to 200 feet and thence 2 - 3 degree negative per 100 feet. Sea conditions were favorable with a state one or lower sea running during the time period of the prosecution of contact E-52.

CONTACT C-28

1. Background. At 1826Z 1 November, Major Flanders, pilot of a C-118 MATS plane, reported sighting a surfaced submarine at 26-53N 70-31W. CTG 83.1 received word to prosecute this contact at approximately 2300Z on 2 November.

2. Comments. VS aircraft and destroyers were immediately sent to the contact area for search, from a position approximately 100 miles southwest of datum. HS aircraft were dispatched to datum when the carrier had closed sufficiently for support at 0300Z. The contact was dropped at 1100Z 4 November when no contact had been obtained by units of this task group.

3. Evaluation. With considerable time late involved and questionable sighting, no classification of any validity can be assigned to this contact. Sonar conditions in the contact area were excellent. Isothermal to 150-200 feet with slight negative gradient thereafter; sea state 1-2, visibility 10 miles.

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CONTACT C-29

1. Background. This datum was developed by other forces and transferred to this Task Group upon the departure of CTG 83.2 from the area 5 November 1962. At that time the datum had been cold since 1700Z 4 November and this task group was over 300 miles to the east. Approximately 24 hours was required for arrival of surface units at datum.
2. Comment. At 0525Z 5 November received COMASWFORLANT msg 051525Z via HICOM net directing CTG 136.2 to proceed to prosecute C-29. At the time the task group was in the vicinity of 24-40N, 68-30W. Datum C-29 best posit was 24-41N, 74-44 W. Set PIM course 250 speed 15 enroute position to prosecute C-23 and C-29. Launched 2 S2F, 2 HSS-2 and 1 AD5W to search a broad front 100 miles ahead of PIM. Aircraft to arrive at C-29 approximately 0500Z 6 November; destroyers to arrive approximately 1300Z.
Set up search plan to execute upon arrival. Search area 120x120 miles bounded by 23-40N 74-22W, 25-13N 75-45W, 26-30N 74-06W, 24-57N 72-42W. One destroyer each to sectors between radius 20 and 40 miles from datum. Sectors as follows: X-RAY 000-090, YANKEE 090-180, ZULU 270-000. One S2F and 2 HSS-2 to search area within 20 mile radius of datum. Three S2F and one AD5W to cover remaining search area.
This plan was modified when contact 5-28, considered a possible regeneration of C-23 was obtained at 0040Z 7 November. A hump fix followed by a sinker followed by DD sonar contact warranted shifting of forces preplanned for C-29 to this contact. This split in forces left one DD for sector YANKEE and 2 S2F and 1 HSS-2 for coverage of the 20 mile radius circle around datum.
At 1415Z 7 November HSS aircraft initially gained active sonar contact bearing 100 T, 23 miles from datum C-29. Contact was intermittent with no MAD verification. RICH was directed to proceed to the contact area and arrived at 1500Z. At 1545Z RICH gained sonar contact. Numerous MADVECs flown by S2F aircraft were unable to obtain MAD contact. RICH was unable to obtain fathometer indication, although contact plotted DIW. HOLDER arrived on the scene at 061928Z. HOLDER gained sonar contact at 2010Z with results similar to RICH, i.e., no fathometer confirmation, no doppler, contact difficult to hold beyond 1100 yards, firm echoes. Contact did not break up after deliberate PDC drops, no H/E, no MAD or JULIE.
Destroyers lost active sonar contact at 0703Z 7 November and HSS lost active sonar contact at 1101Z. RICH was relieved as CAC by COMDESRON036 in R. A. OWENS at 1600Z. During the period

ENCLOSURE (2)

(2) - 3

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072015Z to 072200Z two HSS2 held passive sonar contact. Pilots reported machinery noises and cavitation. VS aircraft dropped SUS with good echoes picked up by VS and HSS on passive sonar. Contact tracked course 330, speed 6 kts. CAC evaluated HSS passive contact as possibly another helo. At 0300Z all forces were pulled from contact area due to other requirements laid on by higher command.

3. Evaluation. Classification of this contact is very difficult based upon the conflicting data obtained from the various units at datum. During the period RICH and HOLDER held active sonar contact, aircraft could not provide verification with MAD or JULIE. In view of the many diverse forces and equipments used to prove the contact was not marine life, bottom or other phenomena, no logical explanation exists other than a deep, hovering submarine. The voluminous recorded data on Contact C-29 is forwarded for analysis. Sonar conditions in the contact area were generally poor with an isothermal gradient down to 150-200 feet, thence slight negative. Sea state averaged 1 1/2.

CONTACT C-23

1. Background. Similar to C-29 this contact was transferred to this Task Group upon departure of CTG 83.2 from the area 5 November. The contact had consisted of a sinker followed up with MAD by S2F aircraft at 1615Z 29 October. Aircraft gained CODAR indications at 2000Z 31 October with intermittent cavitation and a single MAD contact. Post flight analysis of LOFARGRAM indicated high confidence FOXTROT Class. At 2330Z 1 November surface units held radar contact which became sinker. VS gained possible JULIE and MAD; one destroyer gained active sonar contact and held intermittently for 24 hours.

At 1018Z 2 November VS aircraft again obtained a sinker at 24-02N 71-08W while destroyers were still hot at original datum (24-21N 71-27W). SOSUS obtained a line of bearing on non-U. S. sub passing close to C-23 at 1247Z. All units went cold at 1512Z and TG 83.2 set up a JEZEBEL search around datum. All units remained cold until TG 83.2 departed the contact area 5 November.

2. Comments. At 0235Z 6 November TG 83.1 surface units obtained a hump fix (9350 mcs) followed by a disappearing radar contact detected by the Flag watch in WASEP. Three destroyers and HS aircraft were dispatched to the area and gained intermittent sonar contact. At 0400Z CAC evaluated his sonar contact as wake. Units remained at datum conducting broad search of the contact area. At 0755Z 7 November, VS aircraft and destroyers detected a hump freq (9340)

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At 1100Z VS aircraft obtained a disappearing radar contact at 24-23N 72-30W followed by cavitation for approximately 5 minutes. Destroyers closed the contact but were unable to localize. At 0230Z 8 November VS aircraft obtained another disappearing radar contact followed by MAD and JULIE. Again the destroyers were unable to localize and the VS lost contact at 0300Z. No further contacts were obtained and forces were pulled from the contact for higher priority tasks of surface surveillance about 0915Z 8 November.

3. Evaluation. The contacts generated in the vicinity of C-23 by this task group were similar in nature to those generated by TG 83.2. No higher classification than possible submarine can be assigned this contact due to the inability to hold contact for the time requisite to thoroughly analyse. Sonar conditions were generally poor with a strong negative gradient between 100-15 feet. Sea conditions averaged sea state of 1 1/2.

CONTACT C-33

1. Background. At 1655Z on 12 November SALAMONIE obtained a disappearing radar contact at posit 26-02N 70-40 W. COMASW-FORLANT assigned the contact to this Task Group for prosecution.

2. Comments. This Task Group was approximately 100 miles south of datum when the directive was received to take C-33 for action at 0700Z 13 November. Two destroyers and VS aircraft were immediately dispatched to the contact area and HS aircraft were dispatched when the contact had been closed to 50 miles. At 1050Z VS aircraft obtained a disappearing radar contact at posit 25-41N 70-40W. The aircraft obtained cavitation on the contact but were unsuccessful with MAD or JULIE. Destroyers were unable to obtain contact upon arrival at the new datum position. HS aircraft obtained some machinery noises initially on passive sonar. Further attempts to localize were unsuccessful and the contact was dropped at dawn 15 November.

3. Evaluation. This contact is graded low confidence possible. Inability to hold and localize the VS disappearing radar contact gives little support to SALAMONIE's original contact. Sea state was four during the period of prosecution of this contact. BT indicated isothermal from surface to 150 feet with slight negative gradient thereafter. Visibility was low with intermittent showers.

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SURFACE SHIPPING SURVEILLANCE

DURING CUBAN QUARANTINE OPERATIONS

A total of 485 surface contacts were sighted by surface and air units of Task Group BRAVO during the subject period. The following tabulation includes only Soviet merchant ships designated as "Scotch Tape" shipping, Soviet Bloc shipping other than those designated as "Scotch Tape", and all non-bloc shipping appearing to be inbound for Cuba. Photographs listed as TABS to this enclosure have been forwarded to COMASWFORLANT only.

ENCLOSURE (3)

(3)-1

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<u>DTG OF CONTACT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>POSIT</u>	<u>CUB/SPD</u>	<u>REGISTRY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. 041500Z	DUBNO	Tanker	25-05N 67-20W	075/15	Russia	Home Port - ODESSA. Ship riding high in water. Ten (10) cylindrical sealed tanks on deck. Could be mobile missile fueling trailers (See Tab A-1 through A-5)
2. 051100Z	CARIB	Freighter	24-12N 69-00W		Sweden	No deck cargo visible.
3. 061645Z	ANJAN	Freighter	25-54N 77-47W	281/10	Sweden	No deck load. HELSINGBORO written on stern. (See Tab B-1 through B-3)
4. 061650Z	VINGA	Tanker	22-54N 77-43W	281/10	Sweden	No deck load. SWEDEN written on stern. Large now awning over deck house area. (Tab C-1 and C-2)
5. 081850Z	MECHURESK	Freighter	22-33N 73-16W	075/10	Russia	Dark Green Army trucks on deck. (See Tab D-1 through D-3)
6. 081920Z	ALPAJEVSK Scotch tape #10	Freighter	22-20N 74-55N	080/10	Russia	180 - 200 men on deck. Two (2) holds were open with coats and blankets inside. On deck were four (4) trucks loaded with drums, two (2) trucks canvas covered, four (4) trucks that appeared to be oilers, and three (3) trucks with generators or control equipment and small markings on trucks considered to be insignias. The

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DTG OF CONTACTNAMETYPEPOSITCUS/SPDREGISTRYREMARKS

(ALPAJEVSK Continued)

7. 091116Z	MOSKOVSKIY FESTIVAL	Tanker	21-45N 74-45W	080/10	Russia	Captain stated by flashing light to the USS HOLDER "Have Rocket Technicals in accordance with agreement between government of USSR and USA. (See Tabs E-1 through E-7)
8. 091236Z	BRATSK Scotch tape #3	Freighter	22-55N 72-31W	070/3	Russia	No cargo on deck and ship very high in water. Port name on stern "BDYESYEI." (See Tab F-1 through F-3)
9. 092130Z	VOLGOLES Scotch Tape #8	Breighter	21-45N 75-30W	080/12	Russia	Two missile trailers with missiles that appear to be MRBM on deck. Numbers noted on missile covers were in red on yellow background. BK63 N2T 22904-09 and BK63 N2T 2290411. Ship riding very high with screw visible. 85 people on deck including women. Cord wood on deck being used for cooking purposes. (See Tab G-1 through G-9)
10. 092200Z	LABINSK Scotch tape #2	Freighter	22-43N 69-42W	090/10	Russia	Deck cargo includes seven (7) missiles and four (4) trucks. (See Tab H-1 through H-4)
						Two (2) missiles on deck. (See Tab I-1)

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<u>DTG OF CONTACT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>POSIT</u>	<u>CUS/SPD</u>	<u>REGISTRY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
11. 101000Z	RIO JIBACOA	Freighter	22-13N 72-35W	240/7	Cuban	Havana printed on stern. Concrete pipes stacked, forward and after well decks. (See Tabs J-1 through J-3)
12. 102300Z	TRAJAN	Freighter	22-28N 71-26W	260/12	Norway	Departed NOVOROSIYSK, Russia for Havana. Cargo reported to consist of 8170 metric tons of wheat in bulk and 6342 metric tons of general cargo. All information received by flashing light.
13. 111310Z	ALMETYEVS	Freighter	22-00N 74-54W	090/16	Russia	Dark green trucks and crates on deck. Radiating on 9350 mcs. (See Tab K-1 through K-10)
14. 111643Z	KARL MARK Scotch tape #1	Tanker	20-39N 73-58W	110/14	Russia	No deck cargo visible and riding very high in water. (See Tab L-1 through L-4)
15. 111820Z	POLZUNOV Scotch Tape #9	Freighter	21-40N 74-40W	070/10	Russia	Missiles and trucks on deck. (See Tab M-1 and M-2)
16. 121335Z	BAHIA DE MATANZAS	Tanker	22-35N 71-18W	064/8	Cuba	Havana printed on stern. No deck cargo. (See Tab N-1 through N-3)
17. 171300Z	OKHOTSK Scotch tape #14	Freighter	23-04N 68-24W	280/18	Russia	No deck cargo. (See Tab O-1 through O-9)

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	<u>DTG OF CONTACT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>POSIT</u>	<u>CUS/SPD</u>	<u>REGISTRY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
18.	181250Z	ORENBURG	Freighter	26-45N 66-25W	270/8	Russia	Dark green army trucks and deck. Riding low in water. (See Tab P-1 through P-5)
19.	191500Z	RIO DAMUJJI	Freighter	33-39N 72-03W	240/10	Cuban	No deck cargo. "Havana" on stern. (See Tab Q-1 and Q2)

ENCLOSURE (3)

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COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ASW/Air Surveillance Operations. A combination of ASW contact investigation and air surveillance constituted the major effort for this at sea period. Those sub contacts designated by COMASWFORLANT for prosecution by this task group were consistently datums with a large time late factor (6-48 hours). As a consequence the standard search plans using active modes of search were not considered applicable and passive search modes were stressed. ASW daylight operations consisted of radar flooding for the purpose of hold down whereas the passive approach for night time operations was emphasized using ECM and passive sonar to exploit the submarine commander's inherent human curiosity and his requirement to snorkel charge. SAUs steamed on one shaft for camouflage and at slow speeds to enhance passive sonar search. When an SSK was available, he was placed at datum and conducted passive long range search. Aircraft emphasized ECM search with intermittent radar. No snorkel detections by sonar resulted despite many hours of search in this passive mode during hours of darkness when snorkel charging by the submarine would be most probable. Datums developed by units of this task group were for the most part a combination of disappearing radar contacts followed by JULIE, active sonar and sonobuoy cavitation. Contact C-23 consisted of several datums so developed during hours of darkness and the history of the contact strongly indicates attempts to snorkel charge. Active contact could not be held long enough to produce a probable or positive classification. JEZEBEL would have greatly enhanced the task group's prosecution of C-23 under the apparent tactics employed by the submarine.

MAD was disappointing in failing to add classification evidence to contacts with strong credibility in other areas. In the prosecution of C-29, numerous MADVECs flown by S2F aircraft in coordination with a destroyer holding active sonar contact failed to provide any positive MAD. Although this contact plotted DIW at the time, thorough sonar contact analysis and later movement strongly indicated a deep, hovering submarine. For MAD equipment to command decisive respect in submarine classification the equipment must be operating with a sense 10 capability. This, all too often, is not the case. Each ASW squadron must work toward the improvement of MAD calibration if the equipment is to provide the classification capability inherent to the equipment. Contact C-29 indicated the possibility that the Russian submarines are expending extra effort to provide low magnetic signatures.

Surveillance flights accounted for a considerable amount of the overall flight time utilized during this at sea period. These surveillance flights were flown around the clock, often times as primary mission, other times in combination with ASW. Normally, launches consisted of 2-4 S-2A plus an EA-1E to act as middle man. Working on a sustained operations basis, the ASW CARGRU has considerable potential in ocean

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area surveillance. This Task Group had the ability to intercept, inspect, photograph and trail the majority of Scotch Tape shipping designated.

2. Communications

a. Availability of Equipment. The number of circuits to be guarded by the flagship required that nearly all equipment on board be available at all times. With reliability of electronic equipments something less than 100% this is an unrealistic requirement. It is expected that the improvements scheduled in this area during FRAM overhaul of WASP will partially alleviate the problem.

b. Material Failures. The most serious difficulty was the high failure rate of teletype equipment on 100 wpm broadcasts. Nearly all destroyers in this Task Group suffered failures, and one destroyer had all equipments fail for an outage time of nearly twenty four hours. These failures seriously hampered communications and possibly accounted in part for the excessive number of re-runs as set forth in CINCLANTFLT 161346Z. Conversion of all broadcasts to 100 wpm in ships unable to handle this high speed broadcast is considered the prime cause of communications difficulty.

c. Broadcast Guard. Also contributing to broadcast difficulty was the requirement that the flagship copy two broadcasts. This aggravated the teletype situation. The November Romeo Alfa frequencies were found to be unreliable during hours of darkness, resulting in numerous service messages which further over-loaded the broadcast situation.

d. DURATT. This circuit was a major disappointment during the period. Occasionally, as much as six hours was required to obtain receipt for a message, during a time when it was known that the circuit was operational. It was also noted that message traffic appeared on the broadcast that could have been transmitted on DURATT, which was at times, more reliable than the broadcast. DURATT could have more effectively been utilized for re-runs of missing numbers on the broadcast.

e. Only one major equipment outage was experienced. A transformer in the power supply of a WRT-2 transmitter burned out. This part was not available within TF 136 nor was it forthcoming through normal supply channels during the two weeks prior to entering home port although it had been ordered with a priority six. One of the three KWR 37 equipments failed and repair was beyond capability of ship's force. This hampered ability to copy two broadcasts simultaneously. However, overall reliability of electronics equipment in the flagship was high, a direct reflection of the high standard of maintenance performed by ship's force.

3. Logistics.

a. General. Throughout the period logistics support was excellent when considering the problems generated by the unscheduled sailing of the Task Group and the obvious complexities faced by Service Force and other support echelons in supporting the constantly shifting units of Task Force 135 and 136.

In the initial days of the deployment, much uncertainty existed regarding replenishment of the Task Group. It became apparent, subsequently, that this was a result of ignorance of message traffic passed within Task Force 136 prior to the reporting of this Task Group. When this situation was rectified through CTG 136.3 and subsequent situation summaries promulgated by CTG 136 messages, an adequate and organized replenishment of provisions, general stores and health and comfort items followed. Only one AF replenishment was consummated, using the automatic issue procedure set forth in COMSERVLANT INST 4423.2D. This replenishment was accomplished without incident. General stores replenishment from an AKS was scheduled but subsequently cancelled. While operating as 136.2, this task group made it a practice to make CTG 136.3 an information addressee on all PIM messages.

b. High Priority Air Freight. The most serious supply support problems concerned delivery to WASP of high priority repair parts and related materials. The modes of transportation available were not always responsive to task group needs. This was primarily due to task group inaccessibility to air terminal points in the Caribbean area, and the apparent commitment of VRC-40 aircraft to COD or other air transport requirements of higher precedence. Only one VRC-40 delivery to WASP (comprising a flight of 3 aircraft) was made during the deployment. This flight was set up as a result of a specific request from the Task Group Commander. The WASP TF, by virtue of its many flights to NAS Guantanamo Bay and AAFB Grand Turk, did perform "yeoman" work in transporting material to WASP. Had this aircraft not remained in continuous service many WASP aircraft would have remained in an AOCF/ANFE status for unacceptable periods of time. Maximum use of surface resupply characterized the deployment, although this mode can never adequately meet AOCF/ANFE requirements. The delivery at sea of four (4) SH3A (HSS-2) transmissions, each weighing 2750 pounds, by ELOKOMIN (AO-55) deploying from Mayport, Fla., is considered an outstanding example of effective logistic support.

c. POL. Rotation of oilers through the quarantine stations produced adequate POL replenishment.

d. Ammunition. Ammunition replenishment was not a major consideration in that opportunities for expenditure of service and training ammunition were limited.

e. Mail. Arrangements were made to route mail for the Task Group, while operating as 136.2 through Patrick Air Force Base to Grand Turk AAFB. Mail was picked up at Grand Turk by WASP TF or VRC-40 COD from NAS Guantanamo. Mail handled by this route was received regularly and without undue delay. Normal mail, freight and personnel routing for Task Force 136 units was via destroyer or oiler pick up at San Juan thence to line oilers for delivery to ships on the line. This method was subject to delays inherent in a system involving numerous transfers.

f. ARFCOS Material. ARFCOS material for the Task Group was normally routed via NAS Guantanamo where it was picked up by WASP TF. It appeared that the task of ARFCOS personnel at Guantanamo was considerably complicated by lack of a system to provide that organization with knowledge as to location and prospective movements of ships served. Routing ARFCOS material was apparently not entirely standardized in that some material for the Task Group was sent to NAS Roosevelt Roads where it was not picked up due to lack of knowledge of its whereabouts.

4. Boston Area Emergency Dispersal Problems. Although not considered part of the quarantine deployment several problems worthy of mention were brought to light during the pre-deployment period when DEFCON 3 was set. The following comments are the result of COMCARDIV-14 experience as SOPA (Actual) Boston.

a. Sufficient destroyer type ships with engineering and sonar capabilities were present in the Boston Naval Shipyard to plan a protected sortie from this port. The protection afforded by these ships was of doubtful value because of equipment and personnel problems existing in ships undergoing overhaul and the fact that these ships were without ammunition or weapons of any kind. WASP aircraft operating from NAS Quonset Point and NAS South Weymouth could be used to provide a measure of protection and to provide screening ships with an ASW attack capability. This could not be considered adequate protection since personnel of the screening ships are by necessity in a low state of training and the existence of proper communications was extremely doubtful. The probability of having ships with screening capability materialize from ships undergoing overhaul is an extremely variable factor. Coast Guard ships are available as assigned by the Commandant First Coast Guard District. Their value is degraded by lack of training in combined operations and the fact they may have been ordered to other duties when the need for them to screen the carrier is greatest. It becomes apparent that a Boston based carrier, in port, may be faced with the unpleasant decision of putting out to sea without escorts or accepting the probability of incurring major damage by an

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attack while in port. At best the sortie will be made with a screen of uncertain quality and without ammunition or ASW weapons unless provided by the carrier.

b. The lack of available ammunition in the Boston area presents a serious problem for all ships leaving the Boston Naval Shipyard and for ships utilizing Boston as an operating base. For ships leaving the shipyard for operating bases it means an open sea transit must be made with no weapons for self defense. For ships operating out of Boston it requires proceeding to a port with ammunition loading facilities, such as Narraganset Bay or Norfolk, for even small transfers of ammunition. Such diversions for ammunition handling purposes result in a continuing loss of operational and /or upkeep time.

c. It would appear that the ammunition handling problem could be resolved by providing explosive handling facilities in the Boston area either by activation of NAD Hingham or by providing explosive handling berths in Boston along with suitable arrangements to meet ammunition transportation needs.